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IRS summons: six beliefs about what you have to hand over

Cazes Law Editorial · · 11 min read

The envelope doesn't always come to you. Often it goes to your bank or your accountant, and you find out because a compliance officer calls to say the IRS has asked for your account records.

That request is an IRS summons, the agency's formal written demand that someone produce records or appear and answer questions under oath. It's federal law, so the rules are the same for a closely held company in Oklahoma City or Tulsa as for one anywhere else, and any court fight happens in a U.S. district court rather than a state courthouse.

We hear the same handful of assumptions about summonses from owners and from the CPAs who advise them. Some are half right, which is what makes them expensive. Here are six, set against the Internal Revenue Code and the Supreme Court's decisions.

What an IRS summons is, and who can get one

The authority sits in section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. It lets the IRS examine books and records that "may be relevant or material" to its inquiry, and summon people to produce those records and testify under oath.

Who can be summoned is a long list. It covers the person liable for the tax, that person's officers and employees, anyone with possession, custody or care of books of account relating to that person's business, and any other person the IRS deems proper.

Scope is just as broad. The power reaches both the determination of a tax liability and its collection, and the same section adds that those purposes include inquiring into offenses connected with the tax laws.

One distinction before the beliefs. A levy takes property; a summons asks for information. We've covered how levies reach a bank account separately, and the two shouldn't be confused when the bank calls.

Belief 1: "A summons is a court order"

It isn't. The IRS issues a summons on its own authority, and no judge signs it.

Section 7603 describes service: an attested copy delivered in hand to the person or left at that person's last and usual place of abode. For a defined group of "third-party recordkeepers," which includes banks, credit card issuers, securities brokers, attorneys and accountants, certified or registered mail to the last known address is enough.

If the summoned person doesn't comply, the IRS's path runs through section 7604. That section gives the U.S. district court for the district where the person resides or is found the power to compel the appearance and the production. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Powell (decided in 1964), referred to an adversary hearing to which the taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered.

So the flip side of the belief is tempting: no judge yet, so no consequence yet. That's the costly half.

Congress wrote two consequences into the Code for a summons that's simply ignored. Section 7604 lets the IRS ask a district judge or magistrate judge for an attachment "as for a contempt," which brings the person before the court. Section 7210 makes neglecting to appear or to produce a crime, punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

Silence and a specific, timely objection are very different postures, and choosing between responses is a judgment for counsel looking at the actual document.

Belief 2: "The IRS needs probable cause"

A summons is not a search warrant, and Powell said so directly: the Commissioner "need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his summons."

What the government does have to show is modest. Under Powell, it must show that the investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, that the IRS doesn't already have the information, and that the administrative steps the Code requires were followed.

After that, the weight is on the person resisting. In the Court's words, "the burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the taxpayer."

Abuse is a real category, and Powell gave examples: a summons issued to harass the taxpayer, or to pressure the taxpayer into settling a collateral dispute. In United States v. Clarke, decided in 2014, a unanimous Court held that a taxpayer has a right to question IRS officials about their reasons for issuing a summons when the taxpayer can point to "specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith."

Read that holding from the government's side, though. Clarke also said that "naked allegations of improper purpose are not enough," and it repeated that enforcement proceedings are meant to be "summary in nature." A challenge built on a general sense that the request is unfair or burdensome tends to go nowhere.

Congress did draw some lines. Section 7602 bars the IRS from issuing a summons, or starting a court action to enforce one, with respect to a person while a Justice Department referral is in effect for that person. In general terms, that means the IRS has recommended a grand jury investigation or criminal prosecution to the Attorney General.

Belief 3: "If the IRS goes to the bank, you'll always be told"

Usually, yes. Section 7609 sets special procedures for a summons served on a third party. When that summons seeks records relating to another person who is identified in it, the IRS must give that person notice within 3 days of the day the summons is served, and no later than the 23rd day before the date set for examining the records.

The notice comes with a copy of the summons and an explanation of the right to ask a court to quash it, which means to set it aside.

A separate, more general rule sits in section 7602. Before IRS employees contact other people about a taxpayer's liability, the taxpayer is generally supposed to receive a notice saying such contacts are intended during a stated period of no more than one year. Except as the Treasury Secretary otherwise provides, that notice is due at least 45 days before the period begins, and there are exceptions, including one for pending criminal investigations. In practice it's often the first sign that an examination is moving beyond the taxpayer's own files.

Now the exceptions to the summons notice itself, because they're where owners get surprised. Section 7609's notice rule doesn't apply to a summons served on the taxpayer or on the taxpayer's own officer or employee. Nor does it apply to a summons "issued in aid of the collection of" an assessment made or a judgment rendered against the person whose liability is at issue. An assessment, roughly, is a tax debt the IRS has formally recorded.

The Supreme Court read that collection exception broadly in Polselli v. IRS, decided in 2023. The IRS had entered assessments of more than $2 million against a taxpayer and, without giving notice, summoned banks for financial records of his wife and of law firms, including one where he had long been a client. They learned of the summonses from the banks and moved to quash.

A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the exception doesn't depend on whether the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned. No notice was owed. And because the right to petition belongs to a person entitled to notice, the lower courts' dismissal for lack of jurisdiction stood.

The Court's reasoning deserves fair weight. Notice, it observed, can frustrate collection, because interested persons "might move or hide collectable assets."

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote separately to caution that the IRS isn't necessarily exempt from notice any time a delinquency matter enters the collection phase. That's a concurrence, not the holding, and the opinion of the Court said this was not the case to try to "define the precise bounds of the phrase 'in aid of the collection.'"

For a closely held business the lesson is structural. Once an assessment exists against one person, a summons issued in aid of collecting it may reach records that banks hold for the people and entities around that person, without any of them receiving a letter from the IRS. How far "in aid of the collection" stretches is the question the Court left open.

Belief 4: "Once you get the notice, there's time to sort it out"

There are 20 days. A person entitled to notice may begin a proceeding to quash "not later than the 20th day after the day such notice is given."

Here's the wrinkle that does the most damage. The statute treats notice as sufficient when it's sent by certified or registered mail to the person's last known address, and the Treasury regulation counts the 20 days from the day the notice was served on or mailed to that person. Not the day the envelope was opened. Not the day somebody finally collected the certified letter from the post office.

Filing the petition isn't the whole job, either. Within the same 20 days, a copy of the petition has to go by registered or certified mail to the person summoned and to the office the IRS designates. The regulation is blunt about a miss: if the requirements aren't met, "the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the proceeding."

Venue is its own trap. The petition belongs in the district court for the district where the summoned person resides or is found. For an Oklahoma company that will often be an Oklahoma federal court, but the statute points to the summoned party's location rather than the taxpayer's, and a large bank or a brokerage may be found somewhere else.

While the clock runs, the records are supposed to stay where they are. Section 7609 bars examination before the close of the 23rd day after notice is given. If a timely petition is filed, examination waits for a court order or the petitioner's consent.

Don't expect the bank to carry the fight. The statute tells a summoned party to assemble the records and be prepared to produce them on the examination date. It also protects a party that discloses in good-faith reliance on an IRS certificate or a court order from liability to its customer, so a bank that complies is doing what the statute asks of it.

Belief 5: "Challenging the summons can't hurt"

It can, in a way that's easy to miss.

Under section 7609(e), when the taxpayer, or someone acting under the taxpayer's direction or control, petitions to quash or intervenes in an enforcement case, two limitations periods stop running. A limitations period is the deadline the government has to act. Here the two are the time to assess additional tax and the time to bring criminal tax charges, and both stay suspended for as long as the proceeding and any appeals are pending.

There's a second suspension that doesn't require the taxpayer to do anything at all. If the summoned party's response to the summons hasn't been resolved, the same two periods are suspended beginning six months after the summons was served and ending when the response is finally resolved.

So why not treat a petition as a free option? Because the Powell showing is light and the suspension is automatic. A petition that fails can leave the taxpayer with the records produced anyway and a longer window of exposure than before.

None of that means a petition is never right. A summons that reaches privileged material, that was issued while a Justice Department referral was in effect, or that skipped a required administrative step raises the kind of specific objection the statute and the cases leave room for.

The decision is a trade, and it should be made as one.

Belief 6: "Your accountant's files are protected like your lawyer's"

Partly, and the limits matter more than the rule.

Section 7525 extends the common-law confidentiality protections of the attorney-client relationship to tax advice communications between a taxpayer and a "federally authorized tax practitioner," meaning an individual authorized under federal law to practice before the IRS. The protection applies only to the extent the communication would be privileged if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.

Then come the boundaries written into the statute itself. The privilege may be asserted only in a noncriminal tax matter before the IRS or a noncriminal tax proceeding in federal court brought by or against the United States. It doesn't cover written communications made in connection with promoting participation in a tax shelter.

Put those boundaries next to section 7602's language about inquiring into offenses. An examination can change character, and the statutory accountant privilege doesn't follow it into a criminal matter.

This is why the order in which advisors are brought in can matter once an examination turns contentious. We've written about how a CPA and an attorney work together, and a summons is where that structure gets tested.

What we look at first

When a summons or a notice of one lands on a desk, the dates come before the arguments. Four facts shape almost everything that follows: who was served, when notice was given, the date set for examination, and whether an assessment already exists against the person under inquiry.

A pattern we see often: the notice went to an old address, or sat in a stack of mail at the company's registered office, and by the time it reaches someone who understands it most of the 20 days are gone.

We also read a summons for what it says about where the examination is heading. An inquiry that began with a routine audit letter and now reaches customers and lenders is telling you something about its scope. It's also telling those customers and lenders that the inquiry exists, which makes it a tax event and a commercial event at the same moment.

If a summons has been served on your company, or on someone who holds its records, the calendar is the first thing to get right. You can reach us through the contact page or our Oklahoma City office. An early conversation, while the deadlines are still open, is nearly always less expensive than working around one that has passed.

Sources

  1. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 - Examination of books and witnesses — Summons authority; (b) offenses; (c) third-party contact notice; (d) Justice Department referral
  2. 26 U.S.C. § 7603 - Service of summons — Attested copy; reasonable certainty; third-party recordkeepers served by certified or registered mail
  3. 26 U.S.C. § 7604 - Enforcement of summons — District court jurisdiction; attachment as for a contempt
  4. 26 U.S.C. § 7609 - Special procedures for third-party summonses — Notice (3 days / 23rd day), 20-day quash window, exceptions, suspension of limitations, summoned party duties
  5. 26 U.S.C. § 7210 - Failure to obey summons
  6. 26 U.S.C. § 7525 - Confidentiality privileges relating to taxpayer communications
  7. 26 CFR § 301.7609-4 - Right to intervene; right to institute a proceeding to quash — 20th day following the day notice was served on or mailed; jurisdictional consequence
  8. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (decided November 23, 1964)
  9. United States v. Clarke, No. 13-301 (decided June 19, 2014)
  10. Polselli v. IRS, No. 21-1599 (decided May 18, 2023), slip opinion
  11. Polselli v. IRS, No. 21-1599 (LII text, opinion and concurrence)

This article is general information about Oklahoma, Texas, and federal law, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Facts matter; talk to a lawyer about yours.